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Message – what message? 
In the study of popular communication, the term ‘message’ has become so familiar that it 
often eludes careful attention, featuring almost as a proper name, not unlike the equally 
peculiar term ‘content.’ It seems to have slid into the critical vocabulary via some 
unnoticed side door. Looking back at the literary and critical origins of contemporary 
cultural and media studies, ‘the message’ is largely absent as a concept. It does not 
appear in Raymond Williams’ Keywords (1976), in the revisionist New Keywords 
(Bennett et al. 2005), or in the Sage Dictionary of Cultural Studies (Barker 2004). Within 
media studies the term is not included in Horace Newcomb’s Encyclopedia of Television 
(2004). It does feature as a short entry (by John Fiske) in the first two editions of 
Routledge’s multi-authored Key Concepts in Communication and Cultural Studies 
(O’Sullivan et al 1983; 1994), but the treatment is perfunctory and reader is advised to 
‘see text for a fuller discussion.’ And when that book was taken under single authorship 
(Hartley 2002), the term was dropped.  
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Nevertheless, ‘the message’ was deemed sufficiently central to contemporary 
communication sciences to feature prominently at the 2009 International Communication 
Association (ICA) annual conference, whose theme for the year was ‘Keywords.’ Certain 
such words – regulation, the message, the public sphere, communication, and the city – 
were featured at plenary and ‘mini-plenary’ panels organised to facilitate communication 
across the interdisciplinary differences represented among the ICA’s aptly named 
‘divisions.’ (Zelizer 2009).1  
 
The first problem that this paper addresses, then, is where ‘the message’ came from. This 
task is pursued in Part I (Interdisciplinary Encounters). Part II (Madness, or Method?) 
asks whether these interdisciplinary borrowings amount to a coherent conceptualisation. 
It transpires that the ‘method’ of contemporary theory is coherent only in the way that 
Romanticism is coherent – it presents a Faustian agony where knowledge is both desired 
and fatal. The best recourse for method here, I argue, may be to ‘go back to the 
beginning’ and take the ‘evolutionary turn.’ Part III (Evolution of Homo nuntius) seeks to 
provide that coherence by historicising the term rather than valorising it; showing how its 
status has changed over successive historical phases of cultural evolution: (1) the 
representative (modern); (2) the excessive (postmodern); (3) the productive (user-
created); (4) the message as human identity – Homo nuntius. This move requires 
rethinking ‘the message’ not as a noun (a thing, belonging to reason, that can be defined) 
but as a verb (an action, constituting humanity, linking reason to the imagination) – one 
moreover that may now be seen as a defining characteristic of our species (see also 
Buckminster Fuller 2005). Part IV (Fashion as ‘The Message’ of Homo nuntius) puts this 
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evolutionary idea to work in the context of one of the contemporary world’s most 
important social networks. The paper concludes that individual identity is constituted by 
the externalist social networks that we produce and maintain through messaging. 
Therefore, it seems, communication scholars would do well to take messaging seriously, 
and not just on mobile phones. 
 
I. Interdisciplinary encounters 
What is ‘the message’? The answer to that question depends upon who’s asking. 
Modernist literary theory was sceptical about the idea of ‘the message.’ At the micro 
level (the text) it was axiomatic that the intentions or ‘message’ of an author cannot be 
‘read’ from textual evidence (Richards 1929; Brookes 1947); while at the macro level of 
the art form as a whole (the textual system), the ‘message’ of literature as such was 
regarded as non-instrumental (Shklovsky 1917) – anti-intentionalist, if anything. Thus 
‘literariness’ shied away from popular, commercial and mundane ‘messages’ and the 
intentions of author-producers, whether artistic or commercial. Before long, ‘the 
message’ of a given text was relocated to the reader (Hoggart 1960; Iser 1980); it could 
be recovered not from ‘reading’ the text itself but only from a kind of plebiscitary count 
of what a given population made of it (Hartley 2008 ch 7). 
 
1. Madison Avenue: campaigning – commercial and political 
For Madison Avenue, however, and its admirers in political campaign HQs, ‘the 
message’ was saturated with intentionality – their own.2 They wanted to ‘get the message 
across’ in commercial or political campaigns. For them, ‘the message’ was not found in 
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the textual details of an advertisement (e.g. the storyline, characters, poetics) but in its 
broad meaning and overall import (OED, sense 5). This was the message that – they 
wished – consumers and voters would reconstruct from textual cues in order to think and 
feel for themselves the power and allure of a product or party. The efficiency of ‘the 
message’ could be measured indirectly – in sales and votes. 
 
As descendants of medieval rhetoricians, the ‘hidden persuaders’ (Packard, 1957) of 
Madison Avenue – the Mad Men  of recent revival3 – brought to a secular and democratic 
age some uses of the term that were derived not from literary but from Biblical or Royal 
origins. Here ‘the message’ was sent ‘from on high’ – God, or sovereign (OED, senses 3b 
and 4). You can see the attraction of this sense of the term for advertisers: it was the duty 
of mere mortals to heed such messages.  
 
2. McLuhan – ‘the medium is the message’ 
Then Marshall McLuhan popped up, using his modernist training in textual analysis to 
interpret, not literature for scholars, but recent cognitive psychology for some new-found 
friends … in Madison Avenue (Wolfe, 1969). As a professor of English literature, 
McLuhan might have been expected to express the usual scepticism and hostility to the 
appropriation of communicative powers by commerce. But instead he let them take him 
out to lunch, and he said something new: ‘the medium is the message’ (McLuhan 1964: 
8).4 
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This bold hypothesis challenged the integrity of the single text – but also the 
effectiveness of advertising’s stock in trade, spot ads on TV and display ads in the press, 
both of which were ‘single text’ messages. But – certainly in the way that Tom Wolfe 
(1969) tells the story – this only endeared McLuhan to the Mad Men, extending the reach 
of marketing and publicity well beyond the ‘genre’ of advertising, to encompass entire 
media and thence contemporary culture as a whole. His aphorisms unexpectedly closed 
the gap between highbrow and popular culture, between Shakespeare and shopping, by 
insisting that the same theory (media are an extension of mind) could apply to both. From 
then on the study of the ‘power’ of contemporary media ‘messages’ became a legitimate 
branch of textual and literary scholarship.  
 
Here it encountered two very different intellectual traditions, pulling in different 
directions. 
 
3. Marxism – the message and power 
On the one hand, the study of communicative power took people interested in media 
messages away from the text ‘in itself,’ drawing attention instead to the relations between 
‘addresser’ and ‘addressee,’ and conceptualising these relations in terms of asymmetrical 
power. This is where Raymond Williams made his own mark, not least with Keywords 
(1976). His connections with the British New Left of the 1950s, in which Stuart Hall was 
also active, ensured that ‘power’ was thought of in Marxist terms: mediated messages 
were thought to exert power over their recipients.  
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This remains a default assumption in political-economy approaches to media power (e.g. 
Schiller, 1989), even where overt Marxist theorisations about the capitalist appropriation 
of surplus labour power have been abandoned, or at least, re-worded ... into ‘precarity’ 
for instance (Ross, 2009). 
 
4. Information theory – the message as physics 
Pulling in a different direction was information theory and cybernetics (Shannon 1948; 
Cherry 1957; Baran 1964), mathematically modelled and often derived from military 
research, in which the message was something to be conveyed, intact if possible, through 
mediating channels that might themselves be compromised by noise, interference, or 
decay. So, for example, ‘the message’ might be understood as a radio signal, and later as 
bits or bytes of computer information.  
 
Information theory is relatively indifferent to the cultural, social or political value – or 
even the textual ‘content’ – of the message: it makes very little difference whether the 
signals (or packets of data) ‘contain’ speeches by Shakespeare, Stalin or Schwarzenegger. 
The main thing is to understand how they can be physically transported, and what 
mechanisms are needed in order for the receiver to ‘decode’ accurately what has been 
‘encoded’ by the transmitter. These machine-based questions quickly assumed a human 
dimension; for mere mortals, such requirements as redundancy and feedback need to be 
built in to ensure efficient communicability. Inevitably, ‘encoding’ and ‘decoding’ – 
originally machine actions (especially for military messages) – were metaphorically 
transposed to humans (Hall 1973).  
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The unreliability of humans as messengers is playfully proven by the game ‘Telephone’ 
or ‘Chinese Whispers,’ where for instance the (apocryphal) message ‘Send 
reinforcements, we’re going to advance’ is corrupted into ‘Send three-and-fourpence, 
we’re going to a dance.’ On the other hand, the reliability of humans over machines (for 
the time being) when it comes to meaning is demonstrated by the difficulty computers 
have in such Artificial Intelligence tasks as automated translation, for instance. 
 
5. Cultural studies – method deleted 
It is evident that ‘the message’ is not a coherent object of study, but is itself context- and 
discipline-dependent. However, mutually untranslatable usages can be highly productive 
of new meanings (Lotman, 1990). Combining them has been a feature of media/cultural 
studies. Thus, textual analysts from the literary tradition (Hoggart, 1957), often with 
Marxist leanings (Williams, 1977), turned to semiotics (Eco, 1978), seeking a systematic 
and possibly scientific basis (de Saussure, 1974; Vološinov, 1973; Lotman, 1990, 2009) 
for a theory of meaning-generation that went beyond intentionalism; one that could 
account equally for macro-scale cultural systems including popular media (code) and for 
micro-scale texts (performance). Here is where ‘the message’ decisively entered media 
studies – a moment perhaps best marked by Umberto Eco’s influential essay ‘Towards a 
Semiotic Inquiry into the Television Message’ (written in Italian in 1965; published in 
English in 1972; most recently anthologised in Abbas & Erni 2005: 237-52).  
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The resulting interdisciplinary amalgam is what we now call cultural studies. It came of 
age in Williams’ (1973) ‘base & superstructure’ model of ‘determination,’ (i.e. causation 
in the relations between structural elements of modern cultures); in Hall’s (1973) 
‘encoding/decoding’ model (politicising textual influence); and – if I may – in Fiske & 
Hartley’s (1978) semiotic ‘readings’ of television (see also Newcomb 1974), arguing that 
‘the message’ may be open rather than ideological for active audiences, even when the 
‘activity’ is sense-making rather than decision-making or creative fabrication.  
 
Did these heterogeneous elements, combining literary interpretation, semiotics, Marxism, 
McLuhanism and information theory, amount to a coherent ‘take’ on ‘the message’? Not 
really. From these early days onwards cultural studies has tended to delete the method 
from its interdisciplinary borrowings. In this it remains true to its literary antecedents and 
to T. S. Eliot’s notorious dictum: ‘The only method is to be very intelligent.’5 Thus, it 
deleted the mathematics from information theory, the science from semiotics, the agit-
prop from Marxism, and the commercial applications from McLuhan.  
 
II. Madness, or Method? 
1. Critical and romantic tendencies 
Instead of seeking scientific methods or even technical tools to analyse the message at 
both micro- and macro-levels, method-light cultural studies has increasingly adopted a 
‘values’ approach, whether ‘critical’ in the Williams/Hall tradition, or ‘romantic’ in the 
Fiske/Hartley one.6 The critical branch is ‘glass half empty’ about the message; while the 
romantic branch is ‘glass half full.’  
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Critical pessimists seek to counter what they see as the globalisation of the corporate and 
political message by preaching a kind of refusalism – a stance that is increasingly evident 
in the leftist backlash against digital media and the ‘creative’ internet, criticising their 
corporatisation (Zittrain 2007; New Statesman 2009); their exploitation of labour (Ross 
2009), or their physical/environmental wastefulness (Miller 2009). Meanwhile, the 
romantic optimists seek to propagate as widely as possible the emancipationist potential 
of participatory media like the internet and digital social networks, seeing this as an 
extension of the drive to democratise the media that drew them to this field of study in 
the first place (Jenkins 2006).  
 
The point about these oppositions is that cultural/media studies displays both of them, 
more or less all the time. They are not opposing sides of an argument that one side is 
expected to win; instead they amount to what can be recognised as the real method of 
cultural studies; i.e. a rhetorical staging of the tension between modernity’s promise (if 
‘the medium is the message’ then the message is: ‘a share for all’), and its problems (if 
‘the medium is the message’ then anyone who buys it is duped, dumbed-down or a dope). 
The stage is thus set for an especially unproductive game of internecine struggle among 
those who seek to understand ‘the message.’ Arguments assume political and moral 
dimensions, sometimes ahead of (or in place of) intellectual problems or research 
questions. The earlier promise of interdisciplinary attention to all aspects of the theory, 
technology, politics and meaning of ‘the message’ sometimes slides towards a certain 
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rhetoric of ‘critical’ disapproval (of its corporate intentions) or ‘romantic’ approval (of its 
popular potential).  
 
Both ‘sides’ forget that criticism – of ancien régimes – is the founding move of 
Romanticism; and that Romanticism’s optimism is literally a Faustian bargain, hard-won 
to say the least.7 Looking back at the history of modernity, it seems clear that critique is 
at least in part a form of Romanticism, while optimism is also a self-destructive problem 
for collective entities as well as individuals. As a result, it may be wiser to treat the 
current politicisation of academic studies of culture, communication and media as an 
extended play of the tensions within Romanticism; not a stand-off between rational and 
irrational tendencies but a confirmation of their continuing co-presence. 
 
The way out of this impasse, then, is not to win the argument between promise and 
problem, optimism and critique, Dorian Gray and his portrait, but to change the method. 
Here, I would argue, it is necessary for cultural studies to turn from ‘critique’ as a method 
to evolution as a methodological goal. 
 
2. Back to the beginning 
To fulfil the interdisciplinary promise of early semiotic, cultural, and Marxist approaches 
to ‘the message,’ it is important to revisit the disciplinary history I’ve tried to sketch 
above, from which one clear lesson is that more attention needs to be paid to 
methodology, the unsolved problem of any interdisciplinary field. But it is even more 
important to understand that the debates and uncertainties about the status and 
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explanation of ‘the message’ cannot be resolved internally (within disciplinary terms), 
because account also needs to be taken of change in the external environment, beyond 
scholarship – dynamic shifts in the systems, networks and relationships that determine 
what any message might mean. In other words, first we need to return to history; and 
thence to scientific (methodological) questions.  
 
In this context, I propose that a definite historical trend can be discerned, in which the 
status of ‘the message’ has transformed or evolved over the stretch of modernity (say, the 
last 200-400 years in the modernising West). Thence, methodologically, since the field is 
characterised by dynamism and change, it might best be studied using evolutionary and 
complexity approaches than by relying on values (for instance, political preferences).  
 
From this historical/evolutionary perspective, it seems that our species may be in 
evolutionary mid-step. Many writiers have sought to identify the ‘unique selling point’ 
(as it were) of Homo sapiens by glossing the species as one that uses language or song, 
i.e. messaging. The Shakespearean scholar Terence Hawkes (1973) has ‘the talking 
animal,’ the African-American literary theorist Henry Louis Gates (1988) has the 
‘signifying monkey,’ while the baritone Joseph Shore (n.d.) has the ‘singing ape’, which 
would give Homo dicens and Homo cantans, respectively. The possibility of the co-
evolution of cultural as well as biological traits that may define humanity has long been 
recognised.8 The variety of new specific names proposed for Homo sapiens (the knowing 
hominid) bears witness to a long-felt need to explain how the ways that we make sense 
and interact defines what we are: 
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 Homo ludens, Johan Huizinga (1949) – the playful hominid, 
 Homo sociologicus, Ralf Dahrendorf (1973) – the social hominid, 
 Homo aestheticus, Ellen Dissanayake (1992) – the artistic hominid, 
 Homo œconomicus, Kurt Dopfer, 2004) – the economic hominid. 
In the same spirit, I propose: 
 Homo nuntius, the messaging hominid: Humanity the Messenger, or ‘Messaging 
Humanity’ (Fig. 1). 
I don’t think any of the proponents of the varieties listed above are suggesting that Homo 
sapiens has speciated ... yet. So these binomial scientific names should properly be given 
as trinomials (Genus, species, and rank or sub-species), thus (strictly speaking): Homo 
sapiens nuntius. 
 
Fig. 1: Homo sapiens nuntius: messaging humanity 9 
 
‘The words of Mercury are harsh after the songs of Apollo.’ 
Shakespeare: Love’s Labor’s Lost.10 
 
Image: www.textually.org/textually/archives/images/set3/text-messaging-1.jpg 
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III Evolution of Homo nuntius 
Where did the term ‘Homo nuntius’ come from? As for the word ‘nuntius’ itself, 
although communication itself was traditionally personified in the figure of the god 
Mercury (Rome) or Hermes (Greece) (see Hyde 1998) – as in the ‘winged messenger’ – 
the Latin term ‘nuntius’ for ‘the message’ is also occasionally found.  The earliest 
English usage recorded by the OED is from Francis Bacon’s The Advancement of 
Learning (1605). The relevant passage reads as follows:  
The knowledge which respecteth the faculties of the mind of man is of two 
kinds—the one respecting his understanding and reason, and the other his 
will, appetite, and affection; whereof the former produceth position or 
decree, the latter action or execution. It is true that the imagination is an 
agent or nuntius in both provinces, both the judicial and the ministerial. For 
sense sendeth over to imagination before reason have judged, and reason 
sendeth over to imagination before the decree can be acted. For imagination 
ever precedeth voluntary motion. (Bacon, 1605: Book II, section XII, my 
emphases). 
 
Bacon took pains to explain that the status of the messenger is not neutral: 
Neither is the imagination simply and only a messenger; but is invested 
with, or at least wise usurpeth no small authority in itself, besides the duty 
of the message. For it was well said by Aristotle, ‘That the mind hath over 
the body that commandment, which the lord hath over a bondman; but that 
reason hath over the imagination that commandment which a magistrate 
hath over a free citizen,’ who may come also to rule in his turn (ibid.). 
 
Thus ‘the message’ entered modern philosophy as the imaginative agency that 
‘commands’ the link between understanding and desire. Further, the messenger’s 
‘authority’ is that of self-government, in this case of imagination by reason. Here is the 
first hint that messaging may be more constitutive of human identity than has previously 
been allowed. 
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Fast-forwarding to the beginning of the ‘ad age,’ the word ‘nuntius’ provided the title for 
Gilbert Russell’s (1926) book Nuntius: advertising and its future, in the ‘To-day and to-
morrow’ series of pre-WW2 popular futurology.11 Russell defended ‘the message’ of 
advertising thus: ‘Suppose all advertising were suppressed, what would happen? The cost 
of living would immediately rise. Unemployment would increase. All newspapers as we 
know them to-day would cease to exist. The work of Government would be hindered’ 
(Russell 1926). In short, messaging  animates the entire economy and the polity as well. 
 
More recently the term nuntius has crossed the digital divide, turning up as the name of a 
proprietary software application for email messages, for instance.12 Again, the implicit 
assumption is that messaging is the underlying purpose of the whole technology 
(hardware and software). 
 
Four evolutionary phases  
As for the underlying concept that might be expressed by the term ‘Homo nuntius,’ it too 
is the product of historical changes in the status of ‘messages’ over the course of 
modernity (not to speak here of earlier periods), during which time at least four distinct 
phases can be observed:13 
 (1) the representative (modern);  
 (2) the excessive (postmodern);  
 (3) the productive (user-created);  
 (4) the message as identity – Homo nuntius.  
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Phase 1. The Representative Message 
‘Getting the message across’ is a general semiotic requirement of any communication 
system, whether mediated, organisational or interpersonal. However, unlike dyadic 
communication – when two people talk to each other – the modern mediated message has 
been imagined not as dialogue but as one-way communication. In this context, ‘getting 
the message across’ is essentially a pedagogic procedure (Hartley 1999), implying the 
conveyance of something with substance that can be transmitted (ideally unchanged), 
from a sender, via a channel, to a receiver, for a purpose. As we’ve seen this type of 
message was a feature of (mass) communication theory, and was thought to be a feature 
of mass society too: powerful agencies, using professional experts, sent messages through 
the mass media in order to influence the behaviour of reputedly passive receivers (the 
audience-consumer).  
 
Here is an aspect of ‘the message’ that we have not considered so far: its representative 
status, based on an absolute commitment to realism. This is how and why an entire 
system of communication can be transformed into a system of representation: it is scaled-
up teaching, trying to represent the real by whatever generic means, on whatever 
technological platform, to (and on behalf of) a whole population.  
 
In order to represent the real, mass mediated messages were produced by professional 
experts, not by the population as a whole. Those who made messages (producers and 
performers) were a tiny minority in the communication system. These expert-
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professionals therefore represented the population, which was typically understood to be 
coterminous with ‘the nation’ or ‘society’ as a whole: 
 statistically they were a ‘representative sample’ of the polity,  
 semiotically they stood in for it in stories and in the imagination, and  
 politically they acted for it in decision-making – imaginary and real, sometimes 
by the same person, as when movie stars entered politics. 
 
There were very few story-tellers, and not that many story-types, but there were 
potentially billions of individual people within the ‘story circle’ (Hartley & McWilliam, 
2009). In this communication network, using Albert-László Barabasi’s (2002) network 
terminology (and see Barabasi & Bonabeau, 2003), there were myriad ‘nodes’ organised 
by and among not many ‘hubs,’ which suggests that there may be a ‘power law 
distribution’ (long tail) between institutional hubs (vertical axis) and individual nodes 
(horizontal axis).  
 
 
 
You and me, 
Consumers,
Long tail  
Celebrities, 
Producers, 
Representatives 
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Fig. 2: Barabási’s ‘scale-free’ network, which grows by ‘preferential attachment’ where 
new ‘nodes’ tend to attach themselves to ‘hubs’ with many connections.  
This model shows how all the agents in a system are linked.  
Diagram modified from: www.macs.hw.ac.uk/~pdw/topology/ScaleFree.html 
 
However, such a system was not necessarily experienced as dynamic and interconnected, 
especially by those ranged along the ‘long tail.’ To those ‘nodes’ with ‘only a few links’ 
(Fig. 2), the system would seem much more stratified, hierarchical and top-down than it 
may have been in mathematical point of fact. The ‘long tail’ felt like powerlessness, 
structurally opposed – sometimes antagonistically – to those ‘hubs’ with a ‘large number 
of links’ – the semiotic ‘have nots’ vs the ‘haves.’ The pedagogic imperative of realist 
representation, coordinated by powerful state/corporate institutions  (‘hubs’), was to 
connect producers and consumers by means of one-way messages from one to the other, 
without acknowledging that the roles may be reversed. 
 
Evidence for the realist system not being based on structured oppositions, but on dynamic 
change, is that over the longer historical term, once-powerful corporate ‘hubs’ regularly 
become ‘extinct’ and are replaced by other agents whose own origins lie at some 
unremarkable point along the long tail. No matter how many connections a powerful 
‘hub’ may possess, it is still part of the same system as the least-connected ‘node’ – thus, 
a corporate agency or media celebrity is defined by their relationships with all the agents 
in the system, not by their structural opposition to those agents. Or, as Rudyard Kipling 
once put it: 
Now this is the Law of the Jungle–as old and as true as the sky; 
And the Wolf that shall keep it may prosper, but the Wolf that shall break it 
must die. 
As the creeper that girdles the tree-trunk the Law runneth forward and back– 
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For the strength of the Pack is the Wolf, and the strength of the Wolf is the 
Pack (‘The Law of the Jungle,’ 1895).14 
 
Note well here that Kipling’s ‘Law of the Jungle’ is decidedly not ‘dog-eat-dog’ or the 
Hobbesian ‘war of each against all’; it is a social network where individual enterprise 
both determines and is determined by the choices of others, and where the actions of all 
determine individual outcomes. It follows that ‘the law of the jungle’ is a version of 
‘external’ rationality (as in crowdsourcing) where reason is a product of the social 
networking process, not an a priori (Cartesian) given of individual identity. Here is where 
the ‘law of the jungle’ improves upon neoclassical economics, where methodological 
individualism requires the exercise of perfect reason, in advance of choice and action, by 
all individuals (see Herrmann-Pillath 2010). It is also clear that Kipling’s law can only 
operate in circumstances where open mutual messaging is constitutive of the Pack (or 
firm ... or species) – which in turn can be understood as the institutional form taken by 
social networks in the lupine context. 
 
For networked Homo nuntius, however, the institutional asymmetry between producers 
(‘hubs’ with myriad links) and consumers (‘nodes’ with few links) might be experienced 
by both ‘sides’ as a chalk and cheese distinction (where, as Kipling might have put it, 
‘never the twain shall meet’). This apparent ‘alienation’ of each from other was reified in 
(mass) communication theory by the linear model of communication, borrowed from 
information theory, which implied that there was a chain of causation going from 
producers to consumers, but not vice versa. The one-way model of communication 
mistakes rhetoric (persuasive pedagogy) for logic (causation).  
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Thus, very quickly, consumers, citizens, the public, the audience (whatever guise ‘the 
mass’ took) came to be regarded as the object, an effect or destination of a realist 
representational system, not as the subject, cause or origin of meaning. This model of 
communication is perfectly embodied in the realist mass media of the modern age – the 
press, broadcasting (radio and TV), and cinema. None of these technologies could work 
without:  
 an expert system of production,  
 representative status for the message,  
 pedagogic mode of address (in both entertainment and information formats),  
 linear causation of effects, 
 passive (or pacified) reception, and  
 belief that texts were referential (realist).  
 
No wonder McLuhan said that ‘the medium is the message,’ because this was the 
powerful, pedagogic message sent by representative (mass) communication. It may be 
going too far to call it ‘false consciousness,’ but subsequent phases in the evolution of the 
message suggest that the linear, representative, mass-mediated model tended to drown 
out alternative models of how communication works among modern humans.  
 
Phase 2. The Excessive Message – ‘il n’y a pas d’hors-texte’ 15 
The  realist system was already under intolerable strain by the 1960s, although that 
doesn’t mean the model or its adherents had or have disappeared. But already then, and 
especially in environments influenced by continental philosophy and structuralist theory, 
trust in the referentiality of realist representation was in crisis, if not full flight. The crisis 
involved:  
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 the break-up of the 19th century disciplines leading to the ‘new humanities’ (Lee, 
2003) ,  
 disaffection with science in the context of the Cold War and ‘military-industrial 
complex,’ 
 the nascent consumer movement (Ralph Nader), 
 60s-style countercultural hedonism (New Age), 
 Postmodernism, which was gaining ground among intellectuals both within and 
beyond the academy. 
 
In both the realm of ideas and in popular culture, this period may be described as one of 
semiotic excess, based on the idea of ‘the sign’ breaking free of its referent, much as 
brain-work and design had already been abstracted from labour and artisanship during 
the industrialising era, to float – too freely for some – in a ‘play of signifiers’ that applies 
equally to advertising and philosophy.  
 
This period has lasted for much of my career and it has provoked much controversy. 
However, we don’t need to go over that here. More to the present purpose is to note that 
this phase marked a massive expansion in the productivity of the message systems of 
modernity. Simply put, signs detached from realism are capable of much more 
signification than is mere realist reference. Meanings were also recognised to be more 
unstable, often duplicitous, and felt to be increasingly arbitrary, as the lines between fact, 
fiction, fabrication and faking blurred – not least, on the nightly news.  
 
Subjectivity (identity) re-entered the referential sphere in the form of the ‘new social 
movements’ – i.e. politics organised not around the figure of the rational or ‘informed 
citizen’ (Schudson, 1999) but around gender, ethnicity, sexual orientation, the peace 
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movement, and the rest. This was the time of ‘anything goes’ postmodernism, at least in 
the eyes of opponents wedded to the strict referentiality of the sign (Sokal, 1996).16 
 
Phase 3. The Productive Message 
1960s-80s postmodernism was a kind of recalibration of the capacity of the meaning 
systems available for large-scale communication throughout modernised societies, setting 
the conditions for the further expansion and interconnectivity of these networks into 
abstracted or ‘virtual’ formats, boosted by technological developments associated with 
computing power.  
 
The state of semiotic excess proved not to be terminal but transitional – an unstable phase 
where the productivity of the sign was a precursor of a more fundamental transformation, 
this time in the productivity of the user or agent.  
 
As is usual in such matters this later kind of productivity supplemented the productivity 
of the sign, it did not supplant it. So the true transformation was not in communication 
systems as technologies or even as texts, but in agency within them. Here is where the 
concept of the consumer derived from the industrial era transformed into its own 
opposite, from: 
 represented mass to direct participant;  
 receiver to transmitter;  
 passive to active;  
 object to subject;  
 consumer to producer.  
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Here, in short, is where the agency of ‘the message’ flips from the professional expert to 
the population at large – now, in principle, everyone is a journalist, publisher and creative 
artist.  
 
Phase 4. The Message as Identity – Homo nuntius 
Many things can be said about the status of ‘the message’ in the era of participatory 
culture, consumer co-creation, user-led innovation, social network markets, and Web 2.0 
(Jenkins 2006). Here, I want to draw attention to just one aspect, which in my view fulfils 
the promise – the emancipationist desire – of early cultural studies. Now, at last, it is 
possible to imagine, although not yet to observe as a built structure or widespread 
practice, a communication system that is both population-wide and able to harness the 
creative and productive energies of every agent in the system. Such a prospect also 
returns to the forefront of the analytical agenda two of the founding problems of cultural 
studies: the question of identity (subjectivity); and the problem of institutions, both of 
which are caught up in the question of networked agency (Latour, 2005). 
 
Here’s where Homo nuntius – ‘messaging humanity’ – seems like a useful concept, 
because it requires attention to population-wide human characteristics, rather than to 
partial (elite-driven) or private systems, however large (like the internet) and their 
technological peculiarities. At the same time, it requires an externalist definition of 
human identity (Herrmann-Pillath, 2010), which is produced, not by ‘the brain’ 
(Greenfield, 2002), but by externally networked brains, linked primarily by language 
(dialogic, iterative, generative messaging in a coded system or semiosphere: Lotman, 
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1990; 2009). Once evolved, language is causal of further productive change; the species 
as a whole was permanently altered: Homo sapiens nuntius.  
 
Even though each individual must learn language, which means it is ontogenetic not 
phylogenetic, nevertheless all humans and all known human societies rely on language to 
externalise the process of knowledge-reproduction, and adaptation. Language was able to 
act on individuals even as it was produced by them. Thus, although it returns attention to 
individual agency and identity, instead of focusing exclusively on industrial-scale 
systems and structures, the concept of Homo nuntius also allows for the agency of the 
network or networks used, i.e. for institutions, to be part of the species definition. Finally, 
since Homo nuntius is an evolved form of Homo sapiens, Homo œconomicus, Homo 
ludens etc., it follows that it is an evolutionary concept too. 
 
‘Messaging humanity’ allow us to think about ‘the message’ not as an external packet but 
as a constitutive property of humanity. This property is not new, although it has been 
precipitated into increased visibility recently because technological and scientific 
developments have allowed the messaging aspect to be observed more accurately. For 
instance, where once we could only talk metaphorically and abstractly about entities such 
as ‘the reading public’, now we can observe and measure it directly at any given moment, 
for instance via clickstream and sales-tracking data.  
 
Individuals in the species Homo nuntius don’t just ‘send’ messages as an action 
(‘message’ as verb), they are a system of messages (‘message’ as noun); they are both 
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constituted by and productive through messages, which are the process by means of 
which reason emerges (it is the product of a process, not an input). This is what social 
networks like Facebook have begun to codify, and where social network markets – a new 
term for the creative industries (Potts et al, 2008) – are beginning to coordinate into (self-
organising) order. 
 
IV Fashion as ‘The Message’ of Homo nuntius 
From that perspective, then, what is ‘the message’ that Homo nuntius sends about itself? 
In order to illustrate how a ‘messaging human’ produces individual identity out of social-
network interaction, consider the case of fashion. 
 
 ‘The look’ – a dialogic message 
A personal ‘look’ is a complex message, always evolving, never perfected, endlessly 
rehearsed, iterated over a lifetime. Using an infinite set of choices involving body, 
garments, make-up, hair and accessories, not to mention a contextual location and venue, 
chosen or given, in which to strut one’s stuff, each ensemble of elements is combined to 
communicate a single overall ‘message’ for the given moment. In this respect, as Roland 
Barthes (1967) observed, the ‘fashion system’ functions as a language, using intricate and 
dynamic rules to produce the visual equivalent of a poem or a lyric.  
 
Yet despite the complexity of the system, individuals of Homo nuntius are able to draw 
accurate conclusions about each other almost instantaneously, on sight. A given ‘look’ – 
whether that of the Mona Lisa, the latest supermodel, or a 14 year-old after an hour in the 
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bathroom – will repay careful and detailed study. However, it can also be apprehended at 
a single glance. This is in fact the purpose for which such a ‘look’ is designed, often very 
artfully, but also quite spontaneously, as a dialogic message generating new meanings 
promiscuously from a system of infinite potential. For, like language, fashion is useless 
without an interlocutor, in this case the gaze of a real or imagined observer. Whether the 
‘dialogue’ is with imagined critic (‘does my bum look big in this?’) or real friend 
(including professional stylists like Trinny & Susannah or Rachel Zoe [Rosenzweig]), the 
‘formative’ elements of a look are submitted to their ‘summative’ – and instant – 
examination and judgement.17  
 
In other words there is nothing impoverished about a single glance. According to 
Aristotle’s Politics, a democratic polity (i.e. a city state) ought to comprise no more 
people ‘than can be seen at a single glance’ (see Peters, 2001). This is the dialogic or 
messaging element of fashion language, the point of intelligibility towards which a given 
‘look’ is intended; a point that always exists outside of the body whose look is 
communicated. What a dress ensemble means is therefore not as intended or predicted in 
the wearer’s initial choice and arrangement of elements, but in how they are seen by 
others. Meanings emerge and change in a socially networked system of active and 
evolving relationships identified by status-based signalling. That’s the message.  
 
Everyone continuously ‘samples’ this system to check their position, direction, status, 
links, mistakes, and scope for action, and we do this by constant looking, and constantly 
‘being looked at,’ even when alone (Žižek, 2002). The system is not merely complex, it is 
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competitive, as Thomas Hobbes noticed in Leviathan (1651): ‘the value of a man’ 
consists in ‘the esteem of others.’ You cannot opt out, and it is always ‘on.’  
 
Consumer productivity and mediated risk 
Fashion is one of those areas where consumption is itself a form of production, and an 
essentially entrepreneurial form at that. People display on their own bodies the risks 
associated with aesthetic choice, constant innovation, dynamic change, and competitive 
status. Fashion is risk culture in action (Hartley & Montgomery, 2009, p. 71).  
 
For those inside the fashion scene, the right look at the right time is expressive not only 
of belonging to the scene (emulation), and not only of the riskiness of choices 
(originality), but also of a competitive social network in which dress is itself an 
experiment that others may emulate in turn. How you show up – wearing what, with 
whom, at what time, to what venue – becomes a move in a productive system where 
individual innovation is also a ‘competitive advantage.’ Indeed, everyone is on the 
lookout for just that. In this system, individual choices are determined, not by ‘rational 
choice’ or ‘need’ (as per Homo œconomicus), but by the choices of others; and this is a 
definition of social network markets that constitute the creative industries (Potts et al, 
2008). Even if you’re just dressing for yourself (your own self-scrutinising persona ... an 
‘imagined community’ of one) or your own private network, and not for public 
consumption, there is a continuum – not a structural opposition – between producers and 
consumers, even between celebrities and ordinary citizens, in a system that is always 
open to renewal from ‘below.’  
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This is because fashion, of all the art forms, is the one most integrated into everyday life; 
the one most open to aesthetic innovation by non-professionals (‘street’ fashion); and of 
all creative industries it’s the one that no-one can escape (apparel-choice is population-
wide even if high fashion is not). Thus, like language, fashion harnesses the energies of 
everyone in the system. Everyone is networked with everyone else, and there are 
surprisingly few degrees of separation between the ‘top’ (celebrity) and ‘bottom’ (street) 
players (witness the success of Kate Moss’s brand at Topshop). That is how the system 
adapts and evolves. In Beinhocker’s terms (2006: 15), everyone’s creativity and choices 
‘matter as part of a larger evolutionary process.’ 
 
Unlike language, however, fashion is not an evenly distributed human capability (even 
though dress is). Like literature, learning, and other elaborate arts that aestheticise 
ubiquitous activities (cooking, sewing, singing, playing music, dancing), it is a form of 
knowledge. And, by its very elaboration, it is also a teaching institution.  The 
professionalisation of ‘tacit’ knowledge (Leadbeater, 1999) is evident in ‘haute’ cuisine 
and couture (cooking and sewing); indeed most arts take everyday or anthropological 
activities to a ‘higher’ or aestheticised level. Then, these expert variants become 
templates for population-wide emulation. Thus fashion values are susceptible to growth 
and are improved by cumulative criticism and correction. Fashion adapts to change, but it 
also incorporates those adaptations to improve upon its own antecedents. Physically, 
textiles are better (more fit for purpose) than they were in the pre-modern era; socially, 
fashion allows women to transcend gender constraints (women can wear whatever they 
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want) while simultaneously accentuating gender difference (fashion remains a ‘portrait of 
a woman’). Such changes extend choice across vast populations, both quickly (this 
season) and historically (cumulative sequence). A difference emerges between costume 
as an anthropological fact and fashion as a historical one. The difference is that while 
change is ‘intuitive’ (implicit or tacit) in customary systems, it is an explicit value in 
fashion: fashion faces forward. Novelty is organised and coordinated into institutions and 
markets, themselves rapidly changing throughou the modern era. The rigour of change-
driven ‘messaging’ is demonstrated best in the competitive turbulence of haute-couture 
seasonal collections – to retain competitive advantage, the high-end fashion houses must 
completely change their ‘look’ twice a year, while remaining exactly the same as a brand 
that is readily identifiable among the throng. The element of entrepreneurial risk could 
hardly be higher; this is the ‘message’ that fashion communicates as a representative 
system; it is the ‘look’ that individual wearers (users) produce.  
 
Conclusion – messaging humanity 
Thus, fashion is a global teaching institution, propagating choices among hitherto 
unimaginably large populations. What is striking about contemporary fashion in fact is 
not the ‘hight’ of haute couture, but the ‘width’ of its influence – the extent of its reach, 
both demographic and geographical. Since its modern invention by aristocratic and 
mercantile elites in and following the European Renaissance (Welch, 2005), it is 
remarkable how many ‘ordinary’ people are now involved in a given community, and 
how improved are general standards of dress, including standards of professionally-
advised choice within an ensemble, compared with the past, not least because of the 
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tireless educative and competitive stimulation of the fashion media, from Vogue to 
Project Runway. In other words, like wealth and knowledge – and despite the occasional 
downturn or even ‘mass extinction’ – the fashion system is growing (one node at a time, 
as Barabási would say), as an integral part of modern entrepreneurial capitalism, and as a 
globalising ‘message system’ through which everyone expresses their identity, their 
relationships, and their knowledge. The fashion market (including fashion media) is a 
coordinator of choice, innovation and replication within that culture.  
This ‘model’ of choice does not follow the methodological individualism of Homo 
œconomicus, so beloved of neoclassical economics, where choices are based on ‘rational’ 
self-interest, a conceptual framework that requires that rationality itself be understood as 
a mentifact – the Cartesian product of ‘the’ individual mind. Here, instead, we can 
literally visualise the appeal of creative innovation and of emergent knowledge within 
and about ‘risk culture.’ Fashion literally embodies the restlessness of capital (Metcalfe, 
n.d.) and the sociality of choice on the bodies of ‘entrepreneurial consumers’ (Hartley & 
Montgomery, 2009).  
Here, then, rationality is a product of the system – it’s an outcome of social networks. 
Each fashion ‘message’ – be it a person’s ‘look,’ a designer’s collection, or a 
photographer’s set in Vogue – is therefore ‘poetic’ in the original sense of the word 
poïesis (‘to make anew’). It both transforms and continues the world it represents 
(Lotman 2009). To get the message of fashion (the ‘look’) is to enter into dialogue (to 
produce a dynamic identity) with this poetry of the age of risk. Simultaneously it is to 
participate in the social network of competitive individual aesthetics, and thereby to 
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become an active agent in the growth of knowledge. That’s the ‘message’ of Homo 
nuntius. 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 This paper was originally prepared for the ‘mini-plenary’ on ‘the message’ at ICA 2009. 
The other panelists were: W. Lance Bennett (University of Washington, USA); 
Daniel Dayan (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, France); and Annie 
Lang (Indiana University, USA). The conference convenor was Barbie Zelizer, 
Raymond Williams Professor of Communications, Annenberg School for 
Communication, University of Pennsylvania, USA. 
2 See this quotation in the OED: ‘Message’: ‘1925 Amer. Econ. Rev. 15, 20 The 
advertising man knows that people will not listen to his messages unless they are 
entertaining as well as instructive.’ 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mad_Men 
4 And see: www.marshallmcluhan.com/main.html  
5 From the preface to The Sacred Wood (1922); quoted in Pritchard (1998), p. 144. 
6 Toby Miller has dubbed me a ‘hitherto semiotic romantic,’ Miller (2009), p. 187. 
7 The attraction of the Faustian bargain for modern Romanticism began with Goethe’s 
Faust (1808-32), which sparked a century and more of imaginative work in literature, 
drama, music and criticism, including work by Coleridge, Berlioz, Gounod, Oscar Wilde 
and Thomas Mann (see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Works_based_on_Faust). 
8 For instance the work of the Centre for the Coevolution of Biology and Culture at the 
University of Durham: www.dur.ac.uk/ccbc/.  
9 Image from Textually.org (2009). 
10 See Malcolm Evans (1975) on this intriguing line: www.jstor.org/pss/2869241. 
11 The Observer reviewed Nuntius thus: ‘Expresses the philosophy of advertising 
concisely and well.’ For more on the ‘To-day and to-morrow’ series see Saunders 
(2009) and see: http://airminded.org/bibliography/to-day-and-to-morrow/. 
12 The app is called ‘Nuntius-Leo’: see www.softpedia.com/get/Internet/E-mail/E-mail-
Clients/Nuntius-Leo.shtml, where ‘The Lion of the Messages ... might be the right 
translation of the Latin words Nuntius Leo.’ 
13 Cultural evolution does not display the same tendency towards extinction as does 
biological evolution, because cultural ‘species’ or knowledge may remain active 
even after new forms have emerged, and the cultural products of one era may be 
revived in later ones, unlike living creatures (Lotman 1990). 
14 Note that Kipling’s ‘Law of the Jungle’ is decidedly not ‘dog eat dog’ or the Hobbesian 
‘war of each against all’; it is a social network where individual enterprise both 
determines and is determined by the choices of others, and where the actions of all 
determine individual outcomes. It follows that the much-maligned ‘law of the 
jungle’ is a version of ‘external’ rationality (as in crowdsourcing) where reason is a 
product of the social networking process, not an a priori (Cartesian) given of 
individual identity. Here is where the ‘law of the jungle’ improves upon the 
methodological individualism of neoclassical economics (see Herrmann-Pillath 
2010). 
15 ‘There is no outside-the-text’; Jacques Derrida (1976), pp. 158-9. 
16 And see the debates at Sokal’s archive:   
 www.physics.nyu.edu/faculty/sokal/#beyond_the_hoax. 
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17 The difference between formative and summative assessment has been explained thus: 
‘When the cook tastes the soup, that’s formative. When the guests taste the soup, 
that’s summative.’ Robert E. Stake, quoted in Scriven (1991) [from Wikipedia]. 
